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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Education and social security are amongst the most important public expenditures in
most developed countries. The education system to a large extent determines future
human capital and is therefore crucial to productive capacity. Social security beneﬁts
are a major form of redistribution in most countries. These systems interact in in-
dividual and political decision-making, as redistribution through social security gives
lower-ability individuals a claim on the future productivity of high-ability individuals.
Rangel (forthcoming) and Boldrin and Montes (2002) formalize public education and
pay-as-you-go social security as two parts of an intergenerational contract. In their
models, all voters inside each cohort are identical. To the best of my knowledge, there
are no studies analyzing the political economy of majority voting on public education
and social security in the presence of ex ante visible ability diﬀerences inside each
cohort.1 As policy space is multidimensional and voters may have preferences which
are not single-peaked, Condorcet winners need not exist. The aim of this paper is
to analyze under what conditions they do exist. Building on earlier work by Shep-
sle (1979), Cooley and Soares (1999) and Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003), I identify
conditions under which public education and social security can be maintained, with
1Browning (1975), Boadway and Wildasin (1989), Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rusti-
chini (2000), Casamatta et al. (2000), Nataraj (2002) and Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003) present
majority voting models of social security. Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest that the share of income
redistributed depends on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. All
these contributions treat individual productivity as exogenous. Creedy and Francois (1990), Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992, 2001), Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), Benabou (1996), De Fraja (2001) and
Hassler et al. (2002) analyze public expenditures on education in the absence of social security.
2repeated voting, by an implicit intergenerational contract relying on subgame perfect
voting strategies without commitment. I also identify who form the coalitions in favor
of public education and social security, respectively.
I propose a model of an economy with three overlapping generations of heteroge-
neous citizens. The young choose between studying and working. The middle-aged
work either as educated or uneducated labor. Part of potential tax revenue is lost due
to a dead-weight loss from taxation, limiting taxation below a conﬁscatory level. The
old are retirees. The wage tax revenue is used to ﬁnance both public education for
the young and social security beneﬁts to the retirees. I restrict my analysis to a linear
taxation.2 For simplicity, I assume uniform beneﬁts, a simpliﬁcation which allows me
to capture the redistributive eﬀects of social security.3 The citizens vote simultane-
ously for the wage tax rate and for the quality of public education. While modeling
a simultaneous vote on both dimensions guarantees Sheple’s (1979) structure-induced
equilibrium in a once-and-for-all voting, the issue of whether such voting outcome could
be maintained with repeating voting still persists. With repeated voting, I use the con-
cept of stationary subgame perfect structure-induced equilibrium, developed by Conde
Ruiz and Galasso (2003). This concept combines structure-induced equilibrium in a
voting system with commitment to an implicit intergenerational contract.4
2Voting equilibrium may not be established by general non-linear taxation because of the possibility
of Condorcet cycles.
3Miles and Timmermann (1999) report that the gross replacement rate was more than 10 percentage
points higher for low-income workers in Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom in 1997.
4A related concept developed to study repeated majority voting is the notion of a Dynamic Con-
3My model diﬀers from the previous literature by analyzing the voting game on
social security and public education when citizens diﬀer in both ability and age. When
citizens diﬀer in both age and ability, a prospect of voting coalitions across cohorts
arises. Furthermore, social security and public education may derive support from
diﬀerent constituencies. Pogue and Sgontz (1977) have already argued that the pay-as-
you-go social security system provides a more powerful incentive for the current working
age generations to invest in the human capital of younger generations compared to a
fully-funded social security system. Konrad (1995) presents an overlapping generations
model in which the old generation controls the political process. He argues that the old
have an incentive to provide education and public infrastructure in order to increase
social security tax revenue used to ﬁnance their beneﬁts. Pogue and Sgontz (1977) and
Konrad (1995) do not incorporate ability diﬀerences. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999)
analyze how the allocation of tax revenues between public investment in education
and social security beneﬁts aﬀects growth and welfare. Instead of analyzing voting,
they solve the optimal government policy of dividing tax revenues between funding
education and social security, such that steady-state growth is maximized. Kemnitz
(2000) also assumes that the government chooses the social security tax rate that will
ﬁnance old-age beneﬁts and the tax rate that will ﬁnance public education for children.
The interaction between voting on income redistribution without commitment and
dorcet Winner, developed by Bernheim and Nataraj (2002). They assume inﬁnitely-lived agents. Using
the same framework, Nataraj (2002) considers dividing a ﬁxed surplus with overlapping generations.
In my paper, however, the surplus is endogenous as it depends on investments in education.
4human capital formation has been recently analyzed also by Hassler et al. (forthcoming)
and Hassler (2003). Hassler et al. (forthcoming) provide an analytical characterization
of Markov perfect equilibria with repeated voting on one issue, namely distortionary
income redistribution. In their model, individuals invest privately in education. They
ﬁnd out that future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on cur-
rent redistribution. Hassler et al. (2003) argue that redistribution tends to be too
persistent relative to what would have been chosen by a social planner. Hassler et al.
(forthcoming) and Hassler et al. (2003) analyze voting without reputation mechanisms,
while my analysis follows Cooley and Soares (1999), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), and
Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) by assuming that an implicit intergenerational contract
is supported by a trigger strategy.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 examines the voting equilibrium on the wage tax rate and the investment in public
education with a once-and-for all voting system and with repeated voting. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The structure of my model is as follows. At the ﬁrst stage, individual-speciﬁc random
variables related to ability are revealed. At the second stage, citizens vote separately
and simultaneously on the wage tax rate and the public resources devoted to education.
All cohorts participate in voting. At the third stage, citizens make their individual
5decisions on a career as an educated or uneducated worker. As usual, the game is
resolved backwards. Individual life-cycle, except for consumption and saving decisions,
is depicted in Fig. 1.
[Fig. 1]
2.1 The Citizens
With a given proportional wage tax rate and a given quality of education, young citizens
have two discrete choices: (i) investing in their human capital or (ii) entering the labor
market. Those who choose investment in human capital face an opportunity cost of a
lost wage income in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, they enter the labor market
as educated workers. Those who enter the labor market in the ﬁrst period of their
lives also remain uneducated in the second period.5 T h el e n g t ho fe a c hp e r i o di so n e .I
analyze a small open economy, where the citizens can buy or sell assets in international
ﬁnancial markets at a given world interest rate r. There is no migration. Production
technology is linear in both types of labor, so that issues of complementarity and
substitutability do not arise.
Citizens diﬀer in their ability as educated workers. Ability of citizen i is denoted
by ai. The gross wage income of an educated citizen depends on his or her ability, the
quality of education he or she received as young, as well as the state of the technology.
5I analyze a model with one educational institution called university, instead of modeling a discrete
choice between several educational levels. The model could be generalized so that the “uneducated”
would obtain a lower-level education.
6The gross wage for a middle-aged educated citizen with ability ai in period t, Ataiqt−1,
is the product of his or her ability, the quality of education provided in the previous
period, qt−1, and the economy-wide technology parameter, with value At in period t.
In the rest of the paper, I omit the individual-speciﬁc subscript whenever it is not
necessary. The wage for an uneducated individual is At in the ﬁrst period of life, and
Atu in the second. The productivity grows at a constant rate g,s ot h a tAt =( 1 + g)tA0.
T h ew a g et a xr a t ei np e r i o dt is denoted by τt and social security beneﬁts are given by
bt. The net lifetime income prospects for the two careers are summarized in Table 1.
educated uneducated
period 1 - (1 − τt)At
period 2 (1 − τt+1)At+1aqt (1 − τt+1)At+1u
period 3 bt+2 bt+2
Table 1. Net income prospects in alternative careers.
Utility depends positively on consumption. Education has no non-monetary costs or
beneﬁts. As there are no borrowing constraints, utility maximization implies maximiz-
ing the net present value of resources available for consumption.6 Income maximization
yields:
Lemma 1 In period t with an expected wage tax rate τe
t+1 in the following period, the
6The utility function would have to be speciﬁed without access to international capital market.
With international borrowing, total consumption and investment in the economy need not equal the
total production in each period.















Proof. The expected net present value of net wage income as educated is (1 −
τe
t+1)At+1aqt/(1 + r) and as an uneducated (1 − τt)At +( 1− τe
t+1)At+1u/(1 + r).B y
At+1 =( 1+g)At, the equality of these expressions results in Lemma 1.
In (1), e at is increasing in 1−τt
1−τe
t+1 and decreasing in qt. Therefore, expectations of
a decrease in the wage tax rate, that is, a decrease in τe
t+1, would decrease the cutoﬀ
level of ability, as would increases in the quality of education provided.
In each period, there are three overlapping generations. The measure of a cohort
being young in period t is denoted by Nt. Cohort size may grow at a constant rate
n, n ≥ 0,s ot h a tNt =( 1+n)tN0. Citizens are heterogeneous in their ability. The
individual-speciﬁc ability variable follows in each period the same continuous distrib-
u t i o ni na ni n t e r v a l ,a ∈ [0,a]. This distributional assumption guarantees that at any
level of educational investment, there are always some individuals who do not attend
university. While the model could be analyzed with arbitrary values of r,g and n,i t
is reasonable to assume that r ≥ g + n + ng ≥ 0. This ensures that the economy is
dynamically eﬃcient. I also assume that n<
√
5−1
2 =0 .6. This guarantees that the
y o u n gd on o tf o r mam a j o r i t yo fp o p u l a t i o n .
82.2 The Government’s Budget Constraint
With an expectation that the wage tax rate chosen in the current period will be main-
tained in future, educational decisions depend only on the quality of education provided
and individual ability. I assume that providing education requires only human capital
of teachers and professors, the cost of which grows at the same rate as general produc-
tivity.7 The resource cost of human capital for providing education per cohort size of




00(qt) ≥ 0. (2)
The cost of providing public education of quality qt is then AtNtC(qt).8 The gov-
ernment budget constraint with a pay-as-you-go system must allow tax rates for the
y o u n gt od i ﬀer from the tax rates faced by the middle-aged in their youth, otherwise
the voting game could not be analyzed. Therefore, it is necessary to include time sub-
scripts. I also assume that qt is restricted to a given interval 0 ≤ qt ≤ q.H e r e q is
assumed to be so costly to produce that the marginal cost of providing the quality of
education at that level would exceed the gain from increased productivity of those to
be educated.
I restrict my analysis to equilibria in which citizens expect the wage tax rate that
7As the costs of university tuition have risen often even faster than the general price level, this
seems a reasonable ﬁrst approximation.
8The term NtC(qt) is the resource cost, in terms of human capital of professors, of providing
education of quality qt t oac o h o r to fs i z eNt, while At reﬂects the productivity of human capital
outside education sector, and is therefore equal to its wage rate.
9they vote for to be in place permanently, or to revert to zero in case of a deviation
from the equilibrium to be speciﬁed. This corresponds to the trigger strategy speciﬁed
in the following section. This implies that in the steady-state, the previous generation
made their educational choices in period t − 1 assuming that the wage tax rate in




qt−1. In order to analyze out-of-equilibrium behavior of the economy,
o n em u s tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h a te at depends on the expectations concerning the future
wage tax rate. The current wage tax revenue is given by
Rt(τt,τ
e
t+1,q t,q t−1)=τt [1 − L(τt)]AtNtF(e at)

















where f(a) is the density function of a and F(a) its cumulative distribution function.
Both are measured with respect to a cohort size of unity, so that the expressions for
tax revenue include the measures of cohort size. L(τ) denotes the share of tax revenue
lost due to the dead-weight loss associated with taxation where the tax rate is τ.9 For
simplicity, I assume that the share of income lost is the same for each cohort in the ﬁrst
and the second period. The ﬁrst term gives the tax revenue received from the young
uneducated, the second term gives the tax revenue from the middle-aged uneducated
9Those indiﬀerent to education become educated. As the mass associated with any single point is
zero, this assumption is inconsequential.
10and the third term gives the tax revenue from the middle-aged educated. I assume
that wage tax revenue is a concave function of the wage tax rate and has a Laﬀer curve
shape. Realized wage tax revenue is zero both with a wage tax rate of 0 and a wage
tax rate of 1, and there is a wage tax rate of e τ,w h e r e0 < e τ<1, which maximizes the
wage tax revenue. Formally,
0 ≤ L
0(τ) ≤ 1,and ∃e τ,0 < e τ<1:
d
dτ
{τ[1 − L(τ)]} ≥ 0 when τ ≤ e τ and
d
dτ
{τ[1 − L(τ)]} ≤ 0 when τ ≥ e τ.
The government budget constraint states that the realized tax revenue Rt has
to equal the sum of the costs of educational investment AtNtC(qt) and social secu-
rity beneﬁts of bt per member of the cohort of the size Nt−2: Rt(τt,τe
t+1,q t,q t−1)=







t+1,q t,q t−1) − AtNtC(qt)
Nt−2
. (3)
Financing education from the tax revenue used to ﬁnance social security beneﬁts
instead of having separate tax rates for the two captures the idea of competing uses
for the tax revenue. It is not required that bt > 0.I fτt =0and education is publicly
ﬁnanced, bt would be negative by the government’s budget constraint. However, it
turns out that in equilibrium, bt is never negative.
113 Political Equilibria
When citizens decide the wage tax rate and the quality of public education, the problem
of multidimensionality arises. The preferences cannot be guaranteed to be single-
peaked, and the preferences toward the wage tax rate and the quality of education
are not perfectly correlated. This implies that there need not be a Condorcet winner
if the citizens would vote on any combination of q and τ without any restrictions.
However, the political process always imposes some restrictions on decision-making.
Shepsle (1979) shows that including the voting rules can generate a structure-induced
equilibrium even when unrestricted voting would not result in a Condorcet winner. I
assume that the wage tax rate and the quality of education are chosen simultaneously
by a majority vote. When voting on the wage tax rate (the quality of education),
citizens have to make a conjecture on the outcome of voting on the quality of education
(the wage tax rate). With rational expectations, the outcome of the voting game
validates these conjectures. I assume that citizens vote in each policy dimension for
their preferred alternative without abstention.10 Assuming a simultaneous majority
vote on the two issues generates a structure-induced equilibrium.
If voting behavior in any given period would not aﬀect voting behavior in sub-
10Here I follow Cooley and Soares (1999) who analyze voting on whether to maintain the social
security system. As citizens of measure zero would not have an economic incentive to vote with any
positive voting cost if voting does not generate any other beneﬁt in addition to its expected eﬀect on
the policy adopted, sincere voting has to be assumed. This does not seem a too restrictive assumption,
as citizens cannot gain by misrepresenting their preferences. Sincere voting weakly dominates other
voting strategies when voting is costless, as it would result in the better outcome than any other
voting strategy if the individual’s vote would be decisive and would not result in a worse outcome if
this were not the case.
12sequent periods, then social security and provision of public education could not be
maintained with majority voting. The young and the middle-aged would prefer to
have no social security beneﬁts in place as long as they are working, and a wage tax
rate that maximizes the social security beneﬁts when they are retired.11 If the retired
are not in a majority, positive tax rates would result from the political process only
when there is an explicit or implicit intergenerational contract. Such a mechanism is
proposed by Cooley and Soares (1999) where a suﬃcient number of those workers who
would gain from social security when retired are also prepared to vote in favor of social
security before their retirement. But such a social contract would imply that voting
takes place so that voters expect the resulting social security system to be permanent.
I derive a structure-induced equilibrium ﬁrst with a once-and-for-all voting system.
Then I analyze repeated voting. I ask under what conditions there exists a stationary
subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium, as deﬁned by Conde Ruiz and Galasso
(2003). The maintenance of a social security system and public education when there
is repeated voting relies on a trigger strategy saying that if the intergenerational con-
tract is breached, then it no longer applies and all citizens vote in each period for their
preferred alternative in that period.
11In my formulation, the wage tax rate would be zero, implying that bt w o u l db en e g a t i v ei no r d e r
to ﬁnance a public provision of education, if any.
133.1 A Once-and-for-all Voting System
I analyze simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and public education when each
generation assumes that the τt and qt chosen will be in place permanently. Therefore,
there is commitment to maintaining the voting outcome in future periods. In the next
section, I generalize my results to repeated voting.
Deﬁnition 1 A structure-induced equilibrium in voting with commitment to maintain-
ing the voting outcome in period t is, with a given quality of education in the previous
period, qt−1,s u c hap a i ro fb qt and b τt that:
(i) when citizens expect that the quality of education chosen will be b qt, b τt is a Condorcet
winner when voting on the wage tax rate
(ii) when citizens expect that the wage tax rate chosen will be b τt, b qt is a Condorcet
winner when voting on the quality of education.
With commitment, b qt+i = b qt, b τt+i = b τt∀i ∈ {1,2,3,...}.T h i sd e ﬁnition implies that
e at =
(1 + r)




= e at+i∀i ∈ {1,2,3...}. (4)
As the tax revenue, Rt, and the cost of providing public education, AtNtC(qt),g r o w
at the same rate, so does their diﬀerence, Nt−2bt.B y At =( 1+g)tA0, Nt =( 1+n)tN0
14and (3), future social security beneﬁts are given by
bt+i =( 1+g)
i−1bt+1(b τt,b τt,b qt, b qt)∀i ∈ {1,2,3...}. (5)
This implies
Lemma 2 ∀b τt : if b qt =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+1(b τt,b τt,q t,q t),t h e nb qt =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+i(b τt,b τt,q t,q t)
∀i ∈ {1,2,3,...}.
Proof. Follows as multiplier (1 + g)i−1 in (5) does not depend on qt.
By Lemma 2, the same value of qt which maximizes social security beneﬁts with a
given τt in the following period, maximizes social security beneﬁts with the same τt in
all future periods. For the old voting in period t,h o w e v e r ,s o c i a ls e c u r i t yb e n e ﬁts are
given by
bt(b τt,b τt,b qt,q t−1)=
Rt(b τt,b τt, b qt,q t−1) − AtNtC(b qt)
Nt−2
.
It is worth emphasizing the double role of individuals. As citizens, they vote for
the τ and q they would prefer, given the conjecture they make on the equilibrium in
voting in the other dimension. As consumer-producers, they take the voting outcome
as given when making their career choices. The citizens vote in order to maximize
the net present value of their current and future incomes. I denote the value of this
function as corresponding to the political equilibrium for a citizen of age k, k being y
for the young, m for the middle-aged and o for the old, by V k. For the young citizens,
15V y depends on the individual’s own ability a, the quality of education qt and the wage
tax rate τt. In case of becoming educated, V
y








(1 + r)2 ,
whereas for those who remain uneducated, it becomes:
V
y





(1 + r)2 .
The preferred quality of education and wage tax rate for a young citizen with ability
a are given by
q
∗











t (a, b qt,τt).
These reaction functions specify the preferred choice in one dimension conditional
on the equilibrium outcome in the other dimension. Note that the preferences of
the young on the quality of education are not single-peaked. With a conjecture b τt
assumed to be in place permanently, there is a cut-oﬀ level of qt at which the citizen
would be indiﬀerent between becoming educated or not. Denote this cut-oﬀ level by
qc
t. If a citizen does not become educated, he or she prefers the quality of education
which maximizes the social security beneﬁts, that is, satisﬁes ql
t =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+2.I f
16a citizen becomes educated, then he or she prefers the quality of education satisfying
qh









t.12 For a citizen who has a





t. The preferences are not single-peaked as ql
t <q c
t <q h
t and, however, both ql
t
and qh
t are preferred to qc
t.
For the middle-aged, the income received and the taxes paid in the previous period
as well as the educational choice made then are sunk. I assume that when the educa-
tional choice was made in the period t − 1, it was made assuming then that the wage
tax rate in place then would be in place also in period t. Formally, e at−1 was given by
equation (1) under the assumption that τe
t = τt−1. In other words, the voting taking
place in period t w a sn o ta n t i c i p a t e di np e r i o dt − 1. Therefore, V m
t is given by
V
m
t =( 1 − τt)Atu +
bt+1(τt,τt,q t,q t)
1+r








t =( 1 − τt)Ataqt−1 +
bt+1(τt,τt,q t,q t)
1+r







12If bt+1 would be assumed to be diﬀerentiable in qt, this would follow from assuming bt+1 to be a
concave function. However, even such an assumption is not required. All young citizens beneﬁtf r o m
qt indirectly in the form of higher tax revenue in future, and bear costs as providing qt competes for
the same tax revenue as their future social security beneﬁts. As private beneﬁts of qt and the costs of
providing it are increasing continuous functions, those young deriving private beneﬁtf r o mqt directly
in the form of higher future wages ﬁnd it always optimal to support at least a slightly higher quality
of education than those who do not.
17The preferred quality of education and wage tax rate for a middle-aged citizen with
ability a are given by
q
∗




t (a,qt,q t−1,b τt)
τ
∗




t (a, b qt,q t−1,τt).
The optimal quality of education preferred by the middle-aged is, independently of
whether they are educated or not, such that solving qm
t =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+1.




Rt(τt,τt,q t,q t−1) − AtNtC(qt)
Nt−2
.








t (qt,q t−1,b τt)
τ
∗




t (b qt,q t−1,τt).
The old oppose any provision of public education, thereby voting for qt =0 .T h e y
lose from public education both directly as the ﬁnancing of public education competes
for the same tax revenue as social security beneﬁts, and indirectly as a higher quality
of public education induces a greater part of the young to invest in education, which
18in turn decreases the wage tax revenue from the young. All the beneﬁts from public
education accrue only after the old have died. Even though the young have non-
monotonous preferences concerning the quality of public education, it is possible to
establish that:
Lemma 3 In any structure-induced equilibrium, the quality of education is chosen in
order to maximize the future social security beneﬁts.
Proof. With any given conjecture of b τt on the wage tax rate, the middle-aged and
the young who remain uneducated vote for the quality of education that maximizes
social security beneﬁts in future periods. By Lemma 2 and the argumentation given
above, they vote for the same quality of education. The old vote for a zero quality
of education and the young who are going to become educated for a higher quality of
education than the middle-aged. As the old and the young who are going to become
educated are always in minority by the assumption 0 ≤ n<
√
5−1
2 , the quality of
education satisfying b qt =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+1 =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+2 is a Condorcet winner.
By the concavity of Rt, it is in the interest of all citizens to vote for a wage tax rate
with which the net present value of their marginal remaining tax payment equals the
net present value of the implied marginal increase in the beneﬁts they receive. For a








bt+2(τt,τt, b qt, b qt)
(1 + r)2 =0 . (6)
19For a middle-aged educated citizen with the same ability and having received a








Lemma 4 With all n, g,a n dr,t h o s ey o u n gt ob ee d u c a t e da n dt h o s em i d d l e - a g e dw h o
are already educated vote for the same wage tax rate, if they have the same abilities,
and qt−1 = b qt.
Proof. Follows from (6) and (7) by (5) and At+1 =( 1+g)At.
Furthermore,
Lemma 5 The young who remain uneducated vote for the same wage tax rate as the
citizens with lowest ability who are going to become educated.







bt+2(τt,τt,b qt, b qt)
(1 + r)2 =0 .
Substituting (4) into (6) shows that the young to be educated with the lowest ability
vote for τt to satisfy the same expression as the young who remain uneducated.
Lemma 6 The middle-aged uneducated vote for a higher wage tax rate than the young
uneducated with any b qt.
20Proof. As the marginal beneﬁt of an increase in the wage tax rate is the same for
the young and for the middle-aged and the marginal cost is increasing in the remaining
lifetime wage income, those with higher remaining lifetime wage income always favor
al o w e rw a g et a xr a t e .
We can next derive
Proposition 1 In any structure induced equilibrium (b qt,b τt),t h ew a g et a xr a t eb τt is
that preferred, under conjecture qt = b qt, by the citizen with the median net present
value of remaining lifetime income, while b qt =a r gm a x
qt∈[0,q]
bt+1(b τt,b τt,q t,q t).
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 3-6. Lemmas 4,5, and 6 show that the wage tax rate
preferred by the young and the middle-aged is a decreasing function of the net present
value of their remaining lifetime wage income. As the old favor a higher wage tax rate,
Condorcet winner on wage tax rate is that preferred by the citizen with the median
net present value of remaining lifetime income.
The existence of a structure-induced equilibrium with a once-and-for-all voting
system does not guarantee that such an equilibrium would be maintained if the voting
were repeated. An equilibrium which in the future would be opposed by a majority of
voters is not a plausible outcome with democratic voting. I next introduce
Deﬁnition 2 A combination of (b qt,b τt) is a steady-state structure-induced equilibrium
(SSSIE) if it is a structure-induced equilibrium when qt−1 = b qt.
21In a SSSIE the outcome of the voting would not change even if the ballot were
unexpectedly repeated in future. In other words, the combination of q and τ would,
in every period, be supported by a majority of citizens. Whether there is a SSSIE
depends on the distribution of a,a sw e l la so nC(q), L(τ), u, n, g,a n dr. The possible
SSSIE are given by
Proposition 2 If (b qt,b τt) is a steady-state structure-induced equilibrium, then the me-
dian voter on both qt and τt is, with qt−1 = b qt,
(i) a middle-aged uneducated citizen if at least the share 1+3n+n2
2+2n of each cohort remain
uneducated with b qt;
(ii) a young uneducated citizen if at least the share 1+3n+n2
4+6n+2n2 but less than the share
1+3n+n2
2+2n of each cohort remain uneducated with b qt;
(iii) a middle-aged educated citizen whose ability aiii is given by F(aiii)= 1+3n+n2
4+6n+2n2 if
less than the share 1+3n+n2
4+6n+2n2 of each cohort remain uneducated with b qt.
Proof. Proof is given in Appendix A.
With n =0 , the population shares in Proposition 2 simplify so that a middle-aged
uneducated citizen is the median voter if majority of each cohort remain uneducated,
and a young uneducated citizen is a median voter if at least a quarter but less than
one half of each cohort remains uneducated. If their share is less, then the median
voter is a middle-aged educated citizen chose ability is at the lowest quartile of ability
distribution.
22Even though there is a citizen, or a group of citizens, who is a median voter on both
dimensions, such a median voter is supported by diﬀerent groups in the maintaining
of public education and wage taxation, respectively. The elderly always support wage
taxation while opposing public education. Again, it is not possible to exclude the
possibility of more than one SSSIE. A given ability distribution may support diﬀerent
equilibria, depending on the initial situation. Take, for example, regimes (i) and (ii).
In regime (i), the remaining gross income of the median voter is Atu, whereas in regime
(ii), it is At +
At+1u
1+r . Therefore, the median voter would tend to support, at any given
quality of education, a higher level of taxation in regime (i). If this causes a suﬃciently
high level of distortions, then it might be optimal to choose a lower quality of education
in regime (i) than in regime (ii). In regime (i), the economy could then maintain itself in
an equilibrium with a higher wage tax rate and a lower quality of education. However,
it is possible that if starting from regime (ii), the economy would remain there, because
as the quality of education would be higher, this would stimulate a greater proportion
of the population to become educated.
Furthermore, it is not even possible to guarantee the existence of a SSSIE. With
some combinations of ability distribution and production technology, the voting game
could have a tendency to cycle, if voting were repeated unexpectedly. Instability may
occur if the median voter would have an interest with commitment to support a redis-
tributive scheme which would produce a diﬀerent median voter in the following period,
23and if voting were unexpectedly repeated.13 However, if a suﬃciently small part of
population becomes educated, it is possible to establish that:
Proposition 3 If the ability distribution and the production technology for educational
quality are such that more than the share 1+3n+n2
2+2n of each cohort always remains une-
ducated, then there exists a SSSIE in which the median voter belongs to the group of
middle-aged uneducated citizens. If the ability distribution and production technology
are such that at least the share 1+3n+n2
4+6n+2n2 but less than the share 1+3n+n2
2+2n of each cohort
remain uneducated, then there exists a SSSIE in which the median voter is a young
uneducated citizen.
Proof. In both special cases, the identity of the median voter is constant. Then the
combination of the wage tax rate and the quality of education preferred by such a voter
is the Condorcet winner.
3.2 Repeated Voting
In this section, I analyze an economy in which voting on q and τ takes place in every
period. The main question is whether it is possible to sustain the same voting equilib-
rium in a system using repeated voting as in one with a once-and-for-all voting. The
equilibrium is now maintained by an implicit intergenerational contract supported by
a suitable trigger strategy, instead of by commitment.
13Hassler et al. (forthcoming) provide an example in which the majority may purposefully vote for
policies changing the identity of the median voter in future. They analyze Markov perfect equilibria
with repeated voting on redistribution in each period. In their model, agents live for two periods.
24As an equilibrium concept, I use a stationary subgame perfect structure induced
equilibrium deﬁned by Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003).14 Such an equilibrium combines
the idea of a structure-induced equilibrium introduced by Shepsle (1979) with the idea
of an implicit intergenerational contract. A strategy for an individual is a mapping
from the history of the voting outcomes to the wage tax rate τt and the quality of
public education qt that the individual votes for, and is subject to τt ∈ [0,1] and
qt ∈ [0,q].L e t sk
t be the voting strategy proﬁle over τt and qt of all individuals
belonging to generation k in period t.H e r e k can be either y (young), m (middle-
aged) or o (old). As the realized income of the middle-aged depends on the quality of
education in the previous period, I denote their voting strategy by sk
t(qt−1) to make
explicit that their voting strategy in period t depends on the quality of education in
period t−1.D e n o t et h eﬁrst period when the game is played and when the equilibrium
strategy may be established, with the education of the middle-aged corresponding
to the long-run equilibrium, by 0. The history of the game at period t, ht,r e p o r t s
those combinations of q and τ chosen in all previous periods starting from t =0 :
ht = {(q0,τ0),(q1,τ1),...,(qt−2,τt−2),(qt−1,τt−1)} when t>0. The set of all possible
past outcomes at time t is denoted by Ht. The following formal deﬁnition is taken,
with slight modiﬁcations, from Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003):
14Conde Ruiz and Galasso analyze simultanous voting on the tax rate and early retirement provi-
sions. They restrict the decision on early retirement provisions to a binary choice between full beneﬁts
or no beneﬁts at all, whereas I analyze a two-dimensional policy space with a continuum of alternatives
in both dimensions.





t=0 is a stationary subgame
perfect structure-induced equilibrium (SSPSIE), if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) s is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(ii) At every period t, the equilibrium outcome associated with s is a structure-
induced equilibrium of the static game with commitment.
(iii) In any period and for any history, ht ∈ Ht, the sequence of equilibrium out-
comes induced by s is constant.
Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003) assume a trigger strategy, specifying that the voting
outcome converges to a complete abolition of the social security system in the case of
the result in one period diﬀering from the subgame perfect equilibrium with a once-and-
for-all voting. In an intergenerational game with public provision of education, such
a threat strategy would not always maintain the subgame perfect structure-induced
equilibrium, resulting from once-and-for-all voting, when there is instead repeated vot-
ing. The reason for this is that the high-ability young citizens with higher than average
income would like to have wage taxation eliminated after they have completed their
education. With a threat strategy demanding a zero wage taxation following any devia-
tion, the young expecting to pay more in taxes than they receive back in social security
beneﬁts may ﬁnd it optimal to deviate. With a once-and-for-all voting system, they
prefer a lower wage tax rate than the median voter. By voting for a higher wage tax
rate than the median voter, they would change the identity of the median voter in
regime (iii) of Proposition 2. In this way, they would cause an upward deviation in
26wage taxation during their youth when they do not pay taxes, triggering an elimination
of public expenditures in the following period when they would otherwise pay taxes.
However, there is a threat strategy which allows the outcome of once-and-for-all voting
to be maintained also with repeated voting. This is:
Deﬁnition 4 In the implicit intergenerational contract voting strategy (IICVS) related
to an equilibrium (b q,b τ), a citizen i, who prefers qi
t(b τ) and τi
t(b q) in a once-and-for-all
voting, votes for this quality of education and wage tax rate in period t =0 ,a sw e l l
as in period t>0, provided that the history for the previous periods satisﬁes qj = b q
∀j ∈ {0,1,...,t−1} and τj ≥ b τ ∀j ∈ {0,1,...,t−1}. If these conditions are not satisﬁed,
the citizen votes for the τt and qt he or she preferred in period t, assuming that the
(other) young and middle-aged citizens no longer vote for a positive wage tax rate
due to the collapse of the implicit intergenerational contract. The individual-speciﬁc
superscript i captures both age and ability.
IICVS states that any other deviation from the intergenerational contract except for
a deviation to a higher wage tax rate than associated with the implicit contract leads to
the break-down of the intergenerational contract. Once the trust in the maintenance
of the intergenerational transfer institutions is lost, they will collapse. If voting in
some period would produce a higher wage tax rate than in the equilibrium, then the
IICVS speciﬁes that this does not violate the contract. Neither does it give a reason
for changing the q and τ speciﬁed by the contract. Intuitively, working generations
27are not punished by an abolition of future social security if their voting would lead to
paying higher social security beneﬁts than speciﬁed by the contract.15 The strategy I
specify turns out to be suﬃcient to support a SSSIE also with repeated voting:
Proposition 4 If there exists a SSSIE (b q,b τ) with a once-and-for-all voting system,
then this same equilibrium is maintained as a SSPSIE with IICVS.
Proof. Proof is given in Appendix B.
4C o n c l u s i o n
I have analyzed simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public
education in a “European” economy in which the private cost of education is limited
to the opportunity cost of lost wage income. The part of the tax revenue which is not
used to ﬁnance public education is distributed to the old as social security beneﬁts.
When voting, citizens choose an optimal policy in each dimension, the wage tax rate
and the quality of public education, subject to a conjecture of the outcome in the
other dimension. In any equilibrium with a pay-as-you-go system, the median voter
is supported by the old in the maintenance of the wage taxation and opposed by the
15An alternative trigger strategy would specify that all agents vote for q =0and τ =0if the
contract has been violated in the previous period. While this would lead to the same outcome as the
strategy I have speciﬁed, voting for q =0is weakly dominated by voting for b q(0) for the young with
high abilities who would like to become educated. Likewise, for the old voting for τ =0is weakly
dominated by voting for the rate of τ which maximizes the wage tax revenue for the social security
beneﬁts. In the trigger strategy I specify, no citizen votes for a weakly dominated strategy.
28old in the maintenance of public education. The middle-aged support, independently
of their ability, the same quality of education that maximizes social security beneﬁts
in any steady-state equilibrium associated with a pay-as-you-go system. That quality
of education is the Condorcet winner as long as both the young and the old are in
minority. An interesting avenue for further research would be to study a richer model of
the political process, for example by allowing interest group formation and negotiation
between groups representing citizens of diﬀerent ages and abilities. Another extension
would be to allow for uncertainty concerning lifespan or income.
There may be more than one steady-state structure-induced political equilibrium
in which the voting takes place only once with commitment, but the outcome of the
voting would not change if the voting were unexpectedly repeated in some future pe-
riod. In the possible equilibria, the median voter is either a middle-aged uneducated,
a young uneducated or a middle-aged educated citizen. If there is such an equilibrium,
then there is an implicit intergenerational contract which can maintain this equilibrium
as a stationary subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium with repeated voting.
This implicit intergenerational contract requires citizens to vote for their preferred
alternative with once-and-for-all voting also with repeated voting. The implicit in-
tergenerational contract that I identify can be maintained with sustained demographic
change and productivity growth, provided that the productivity of the educated as well
as that of the uneducated grow at the same rate as the costs of providing education of
a given quality.
29Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
As the quality of education chosen is given by Lemma 3 and is that preferred by the
claimed median voter in each regime, it suﬃces to analyze voting on the wage tax rate.
In period t,t h e r ea r e(1+n)2Nt−2 young citizens, (1+n)Nt−2 middle-aged citizens and
Nt−2 old citizens. Therefore total population size is (3 + 3n + n2)Nt−2.
(i) 1+3n+n2
2+2n (1+n)Nt−2 +Nt−2 =( 3+3 n+n2)Nt−2/2, and therefore the old and the
middle-aged uneducated alone are suﬃcient to form a majority. All other voters would
prefer a lower wage tax rate by Lemmas 4, 5, and 6.
(ii) The old and the middle-aged uneducated alone are not enough to form a ma-
jority in this case. Together with a suﬃcient number of the young uneducated, they
form the majority. Median voter is then young uneducated citizen by Lemmas 4, 5,
and 6.
(iii) Those young and middle-aged educated with ability higher (lower) than aiii
favor a lower (higher) wage tax rate by Lemmas 4, 5, and 6. As 1+3n+n2
4+6n+2n2(1+n)2Nt−2+
1+3n+n2
4+6n+2n2(1+n)Nt−2+Nt−2 =( 3+3 n+n2)Nt−2/2, the citizen with ability aiii is now a
median voter. As the quality of education chosen is that preferred by the middle-aged
and the young uneducated, the median voter is a middle-aged citizen with ability aiii
and not a young citizen with aiii, the latter preferring a higher q.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that (b q,b τ) is a SSSIE with voting with commitment. It is suﬃcient to prove
that with IICVS, the citizens either do not want to deviate or if they would like to
30deviate, then their deviation does not change the outcome of the voting in a way that
would result in the collapse of the intergenerational contract. The old have clearly no
interest in deviating from voting for the τ and q which would maximize their current
social security beneﬁts. Neither do the middle-aged have any incentive to deviate
from the τ and q they would prefer with commitment. A deviation downward in the
wage tax rate or the quality of education would only result in them losing their social
security beneﬁts in the following period. The young uneducated, on the other hand,
already vote for the q and t that would maximize their lifetime utility, so they have no
incentive to deviate. As for the young citizens who are going to become educated, they
are in any case in minority when voting on the quality of education, so any deviation in
that dimension by them would have no eﬀect on the voting outcome. When voting on
the wage tax rate, the young who are going to lose from income redistribution would
prefer to have the wage taxation and public provision of education abolished in future.
However, they are already voting for a lower wage tax rate than the median voter, so
that any deviation downward would not aﬀect the outcome of the voting. The only way
in which the young who prefer a lower wage tax rate than that preferred by the median
voter can change the outcome of voting is by voting for a higher wage tax rate than
that preferred by the median voter. By the deﬁnition of IICVS, a deviation upward
would not cause the abolition of wage taxation and public provision of education.
Therefore, the young who will become educated cannot gain anything by deviating
from voting for their preferred wage tax rate with once-and-for-all voting. The threat
31point of the voting equilibrium (0,0) following a punishable deviation is also a subgame
perfect Nash-equilibrium. If the young and the middle-aged expect that social security
beneﬁts will not be maintained in future, they have no interest in maintaining them
after a deviation. This implies that the middle-aged would join the old in opposing
any investment in public education. The old would still vote for τ>0 and the young
with high ability for q>0, but both are in minority.
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